## Algorithmic (un)fairness: a research agenda



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#### why are black women so angry why are black women so angry why are black women so loud why are black women so mean why are black women so attractive why are black women so lazy why are black women so annoying why are black women so confident why are black women so sassy why are black women so insecure ALGORITHMS

### **OPPRESSION**

HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM

SAFIYA UMOJA NOBLE

#### TECHNICALLY WRONG

SEXIST APPS, BIASED ALGORITHMS, AND OTHER THREATS OF TOXIC TECH

SARA WACHTER-BOETTCHER

"This book is downright scry—but...you will emerge smarter and more empowered to demand justice." —NAOMI KLEIN



#### AUTOMATING I N E Q U A L I T Y

HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR



HELLO WC RLD

Being Human in the Age of Algorithms

HANNAH FRY





### Expanding context: Fairness









# A simple problem: classification









Hiring

College admission

Loan



 $\mathfrak{M}$ 

I treat you differently because of your race

Individual fairness Individuals with similar abilities should be treated the same

Group fairness

Structural bias against groups

Groups should all be treated *similarly* 





Individual fairness  $d(x,y) \le \epsilon \Rightarrow D(C(x),C(y)) \le \delta$ Group fairness  $|\Pr(C=1 \mid g=0) - \Pr(C=1 \mid g=1)| \le \epsilon$ 

$$\frac{\Pr(C = 1 | g = 0) - \Pr(C = 1 | g = 1)}{\Pr(C = 1 | g = 1)} \ge 1 - \epsilon$$





R Individual fairness

 $d(x,y) \le \epsilon \Rightarrow d(C(x),C(y)) \le \delta$ 

R Group fairness

 $(FP, FN)_0 \simeq (FP, FN)_1$ 





R Individual fairness

 $d(x, y) \le \epsilon \Rightarrow d(C(x), C(y)) \le \delta$ 

R Group fairness



#### Predicted





### Unifying notions of fairness



Outcome independent of group given other factors

$$(a + \sum_{i} b_i \mathbf{y}_i) \perp \mathbf{s},$$
  
 $\mathbf{y}_i = \Pr(\mathbf{y} = 1 | E_i)$ 

[CHKV19] Linear combination of conditional outcomes independent of group  $\mathbf{y} \perp \mathbf{c} \mid \{\mathbf{e} = e\}$ 

[HLGK19] Outcome independent of circumstances, given efort



# A computational notion of fairness

Group:  $g_M = \{x \mid M(x) = 1\}$ 

*M* : circuit of size *s* 

Decision procedure is **fair** if it is fair for any group that can be defined with respect to a size-s circuit M. [**HKRR17, KNRW17**]

Connections to hardness of agnostic learning.



### Fairness mechanisms



### Make algorithmic decisionmaking fair



Modify the input

Modify the algorithm

Modify the output



### Make algorithmic decisionmaking fair



### Modify the input



### **Direct and Indirect Bias**



Source: Library of Congress (http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/civil-rights-act/segregation-era.html#obj24)



### Direct and Indirect Bias





By http://cml.upenn.edu/redlining/HOLC\_1936.html, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=34781276

## Information content and indirect influence



the information content of a feature can be estimated by trying to predict it from the remaining features

Given variables X, Y that are correlated, find Y' conditionally **independent** of X such that Y' is as similar to X as possible.



## Check information flow via computation



- ∝ Strip out X in some way, to get Y
- See if we can predict X' = X from Y with the best possible method.



### Disparate Impact

$$\frac{\Pr(C=1\mid g=0)}{\Pr(C=1\mid g=1)} \ge 1-\epsilon$$

 $\epsilon < 0.2$ 

#### "4/5 rule":

There is a potential for disparate impact if the ratio of classconditioned success probabilities is at most 4/5 Focus on **outcome**, rather than **intent**.



### Certification via prediction



Theorem: If we can predict X from Y with probability  $\varepsilon$ , then our classifier has **potential disparate impact** with level  $g(\varepsilon)$ .



## Fixing data bias





## Using the earthmover distance

Let 
$$P_i = \Pr(Y = y | X = i)$$
$$F_i = \text{cdf of } P_i$$
$$P_* = \arg\min\sum_i d_{EM}(P, P_i)$$

$$F_*^{-1}(\lambda) = \operatorname{median} F_i^{-1}(\lambda)$$

We find a new distribution that is "close" to all conditional distributions.



### Moving them together





# Learning fair representations



[ZWSPD13, ES16, MCPZ18]



### Make algorithmic decisionmaking fair



Modify the algorithm



### Defining proxies for fairness

Classifier  $\hat{y} = f(x; \theta)$ 

min  $L(\theta)$  $|\Pr(\hat{y} \neq y \mid z = 1) - \Pr(\hat{y} \neq y \mid z = 0)| \le \epsilon$ 

Goal [**ZVRG16**] : Eliminate correlation between sensitive attribute and (signed) *distance to decision boundary:* 

$$Cov(z, g_{\theta}(y, x) = \mathbb{E}[(z - \bar{z})(g_{\theta}(y, x) - \bar{g}_{\theta}(y, x))]$$
$$\simeq \frac{1}{n} \sum (z - \bar{z})g_{\theta}(y, x)$$
where  $g_{\theta}(y, x) = \min(0, yd_{\theta}(x))$ 



# Comparing measures of fairness



DIbinary DIavgall comparative-sensitive-TPR accuracy 0-accuracy 1-accuracy sensitive-accuracy TNR sensitive-TNR BCR sensitive-calibration+ comparative-sensitive-accuracy comparative-sensitive-TNR TPR sensitive-TPR sensitive-calibration-





# Comparing mechanisms for fairness



[FSVCHR19]



#### But wait... there's more

#### Recourse [USL19]

Measure the amount of *effort* it would take to move a point from a negative to positive classification

#### 

How would the algorithm have changed decisions if the sensitive attribute was flipped?



## Expanding Context: Audits



### **Research Question**



Given a black box function

 $Y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ 

R How do we quantify influence

Real How do we model it (random perturbations?)

R How do we handle *indirect* and *joint* influence



### Landscape of work

 $y = f(\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_d))$ 

To what extent does a feature influence the model?
Determine whether model is using impermissible or odd features

- To what extent did the feature influence the outcome for x? [RSG16, SSZ18]
  - GR Generate an explanation for a decision, or a method of recourse (GDPR)



### Influence via perturbation [B01]

Key is the design of the intervention distributon

 $Y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$  $x_1' \sim B_{\epsilon}(x_1)$ 

 $Y' = f(x'_1, \ldots, x_n)$  $\inf_{\epsilon}(x_1) = |Y - Y'| = \Delta(Y)$ 

[HPBAP14, DSZ16, LL18,...]


# Information content and indirect influence



the information content of a feature can be estimated by trying to predict it from the remaining features [AFFNRSSV16,17]

Given variables X, W that are correlated, find W' conditionally **independent** of X such that W' is as similar to W as possible.

Influence(W) (without X) =  $\Delta(Y)$ 



# Can we understand a model?



- Dark reactions project: predict presence/absence of a certain compound in a complex reaction.
- 273 distinct features.
- Approach identified key variables for further study that appear to influence the models.



### Feedback loops





### **Predictive Policing**



The LAPD Has a New Surveillance Formula, Powered by Palantir HunchLab



### Feedback Loops



To Predict and Serve, Lum and Isaac (2016)





### Building a model



#### Assumptions.

- 1. Officer tosses coin based on current model to decide where to go next
- 2. Only information retained about crime is the count
- 3. If officers goes to area with baseline crime rate r, they will see crime with probability r.

#### Goal:

A region with X% of crime should receive X% of policing.



### Urn Models

Ht



- 1. Sample a ball at random from the urn
- 2. Replace the ball and add/remove more balls depending on the color (replacement matrix)
- 3. Repeat







### From policing to urns

Assume we have two neighborhoods, and that each is one **color.** 

Visiting neighborhood = sampling ball of that color (Assumption 1)

 $\bigcirc$  Observing crime = adding a new ball of that color.



### Urn 1: Uniform crime rates

Assume both regions have the same crime rate r.



This is an urn conditioned on the events where a ball is inserted.



### Urn 1: Uniform crime rates

#### Theorem (folklore)

If the urn starts with  $A \odot$  and  $B \odot$ , then the limiting probability of  $\odot$  is a random draw from the distribution Beta(A, B)

### Implication

This is independent of the actual crime rate, and is only governed by initial conditions (i.e initial *belief*).



### Urn 2: Different crime rates

 $\curvearrowright$  Regions have crime rates  $r_A$  and  $r_B$ 



This is an urn **conditioned** on the events where a ball is inserted (proof in our paper).



### Urn 2: Different crime rates



$$(c+d-a-b)x^{2} + (a-2c-d)x + c = 0$$



### Urn 2: Different crime rates



$$(c+d-a-b)x^{2} + (a-2c-d)x + c = 0$$

$$call b = c = 0, a = r_A, d = r_B$$

#### Implication

If  $r_A > r_B$ , estimated probability of crime in A = 1.





- Intuition: only update the model if the sample is "surprising".
  - □ If probability of is p, then only update model when seeing p with probability 1-p = ).
  - Guarantees that model estimates are proportional to true probabilities
  - ca "rejection-sampling" variant of Horvitz-Thompson estimator.





Model problem as a reinforcement learning question
 Specifically as a *partial monitoring problem*

R Yields no-regret algorithms for predictive policing

Improvements and further strengthening by [EJJKNRS19]



### Game Theoretic Feedback

Can we design a decision process that cannot be gamed by users seeking an advantage [HMPW16]?

- [MMDH18]: any attempt to be strategy-proof can cause an extra burden tp disadvantaged groups.
- [HIV18]: if groups have different costs for improving themselves, strategic classification can hurt weaker groups and subsidies can hurt both groups.



### But wait... there's more

Suppose the decision-making process is a sequence of decisions

- Admission to college →Getting a job →Getting promoted
- R Do fairness interventions "compose"?
  R NO! [BKNSVV17, ID18]
  - Can we make intermediate interventions so as to achieve end-to-end fairness? [HC17, KRZ18]



# Expanding context: Society





- Notions of fairness first studied in context of standardized testing and race-based discrimination (early 60s)
- Recommendations: focus more on *unfairness* rather than fairness, and how to reduce it.



# How do people accept algorithmic decision-making?

What did judges do when risk assessment tools for pretrial hearings were rolled out? [Stevenson18]
 Changes in bail

- R Little to no change in pretrial release
- Reversion to pre-RAT behavior over time.
- How are people likely to behave when given algorithmic "guidance"? [Green-Chen 19]
   Exhibit biased behavior even with guidance
   Underperform algorithm.



Two computer scientists, two sociologists and a lawyer walk into a bar...



Two computer scientists, two sociologists and a lawyer walk into a bar...



Fairness And Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems, FAT\* 2019. Selbst, boyd, Friedler, V. and Vertesi.

# The problem with abstraction



- CS modeling falls into *traps* when modeling sociotechnical systems
- Reproposed solutions are ineffective at best, and exacerbate the problems if worse.
- We need to identify these traps to avoid constantly falling into them.



## 1. The Framing Trap

Failure to model the entire system over which a social criterion, like fairness, will be enforced.



Fair risk assessment provides guarantees on disparate impact

Judge disregards recommendation when it doesn't align with "gut instinct"



## 2. The Modularity Trap

Failure to understand how repurposing algorithmic solutions designed for one social context may be misleading, inaccurate, or otherwise do harm when applied to a different context



OF UTAH

## 3. The Formalism Trap

Failure to account for the full meaning of social concepts such as fairness, which can be procedural, contextual, and contestable, and cannot be resolved through mathematical formalisms

Definitions of fairness are:

- Reprocess-based rather than outcome-based
- R Depend on the context in which they are being used.



## 4. The Ripple Effect Trap

Failure to understand how the insertion of technology into an existing social system changes the behaviors and embedded values of the pre-existing system

### Why Amazon's Automated Hiring Tool Discriminated Against Women





## 5. The Solutionism Trap

Failure to recognize the possibility that the best solution to a problem may not involve technology

### Elon Musk's Chicago Tunnel: A Breakthrough or a Pipe Dream?





# Science and Technology Studies



- Recognize that we are dealing with **socio**technical systems



## Avoiding the traps



### Framing Trap

### Modularity Trap

Heterogeneous engineering or "human in the loop" design [GC19]

### Formalism Trap

Interpretive flexibility. Avoid rhetorical closure.



Model cards [MW+18] Data sheets [GMV+18,BF19] Nutrition labels [YSA+18, MIT Media Lab]

### Ripple effect Trap

Model feedback loops [EFNSV+18a,EFNSV+18b,EJJ +18] Strategic classification [HIV18,MM+18]

### The research

Defining **(un)fairness** and fairness-enhancing procedures Understanding interaction between system and agents.

Understanding **influence** of inputs to black/gray-box procedures

Evaluating interventions in larger social context



### Things I didn't touch on

Articulating harms of representation (GIGO)

Tools to **interpret** and **explain** decisions (GDPR)

Interaction between **policy**, **technology** and the **law**.

Tensions between **privacy** and the desire for fairness.



## The questions





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Thank you!

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